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State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Letting the Dormant Commerce Clause Lie
Whoever removes this boundary-marker...
may the great gods as many as are mentioned
by their names on this boundary-marker, curse him
with an evil curse, tear out his foundation and destroy his seed.
-Curse from a Babylonian kudurrul
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace2 seems to pose a dual threat to "Our Federalism."
Only one aspect of this threat, however, has captured the scholarly
imagination. Commentators have devoted a great deal of attention to
the problems of horizontal federalism raised by the new technology.4
Cyberspace, they point out, is a profoundly integrative social and
economic force. As a result, local legislation touching on cyberspace is
likely to produce effects beyond local borders. 5 State laws like a
recently deceased Georgia statute that arguably would have
prohibited all Internet users from "falsely identifying" themselves on-
lines convince observers that the information superhighway is a
dangerous new means for states to export their legislative products to
other jurisdictions. Although the danger is more potential than
actual, the pages of recent law reviews echo with calls for preemptive
2. The term "cyberspace" was coined by William Gibson in NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
Although the terms will be used synonymously here, the "Internet" and cyberspace have some-
what different meanings. The Internet refers to those networks which use the TCP/IP protocol
suite to route information; cyberspace includes the broader range of nonphysical "places" where
electronic communication takes place. See Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU:
Insulating the Internet, the First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV.
1945, 1948 n.8 (1997) (defining cyberspace).
3. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (Iis ... is referred to by many as 'Our
Federalism,' and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution
into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of 'Our
Federalism.' ").
4. See generally Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (1996)
(arguing that spillovers from state regulation of the Internet implicate constitutional doctrines
designed to preserve the coherence of the United States as a whole); Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Virtual Reality and "Virtual Welters": A Note on the Commerce Clause Implications of
Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. REv. 535 (1996) (advocating a role for "nationalist parts of the
Constitution," like the dormant Commerce Clause, in constraining state regulation of the
Internet); Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation
of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889 (1998) (concluding that "the
constitutional limits our national framework of federalism imposes on the states" mandate that
the Internet be subject only to uniform federal regulation).
5. This is the natural outgrowth of Professor Lessig's integration thesis. See Lawrence
Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 138-39.
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1(a) (1996). The ACLU gave the statute this interpretation
in its trial brief, available at <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/GABRIEF.html> (visited
Mar. 1, 1999). A preliminary injunction enjoining the statute's enforcement on First
Amendment grounds was granted inACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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federal legislation,7 or more commonly, for self-regulation with
minimal governmental interference.8
The more strident of these calls highlight the cyberspace
threat that has largely been ignored: the threat to vertical
federalism. Cyberspace imbues state regulation with tremendous
potential for extraterritorial effect, potential which invites the federal
judiciary to cut down a broad swath of state law. This invitation is
made all the more appealing by the rather amorphous nature of the
Supreme Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence. The Constitution
contains no explicit command forbidding states from projecting their
legislation beyond their own borders. The Court might be expected to
infer that directive from constitutional structure,9 but instead has
sited the proposition in a succession of unlikely textual locales: the
Contracts Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Due
Process Clause. 10 The current locus of the extraterritoriality principle
seems to be a line of dormant Commerce Clause cases stemming from
Edgar v. MITE Corp." One commentator has dubbed Edgar and its
progeny "the new territorialism;"2 others have seized on the cases'
seeming insistence on strict territorial sovereignty and suggested that
the dormant Commerce Clause seriously curtails states' ability to
regulate the Internet.13 Such expansive readings of the cases have
7. See, e.g., Alexander Gigante, Blackhole in Cyberspace: The Legal Void in the Internet,
15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 413, 436 (1997) (advocating an international
agreement on the structure of Internet governance); Christina K. McGlosson, Who Needs Wall
Street? The Dilemma of Regulating Securities Trading in Cyberspace, 5 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS
305, 322 (1997) (urging the Securities and Exchange Commission to propose uniform federal
regulations to preempt state regulations governing online trading).
8. See generally John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38
HARV. INT'L L.J. 207 (1997) (arguing for a rating system and the distribution of screening
software as a response to objectionable content and Internet misuse); LIewellyn Joseph Gibbons,
No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social
Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 475 (1997) (arguing
that self-regulation of the Internet best effectuates the pragmatic needs of the real world);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1367 (1996) (advocating self-regulation of the Internet).
9. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (I) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1865, 1894-95 (1987) ("W~e should justify the extraterritoriality principle, not by pointing
to any specific clause of the Constitution, but by a structural inference from our system as a
whole.").
10. See infra Part V.A-B.
11. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (analyzing whether the Illinois Business
Takeover Act is unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the federal
Constitution).
12. C. Steven Bradford, What Happens If Roe Is Overruled? Extraterritorial Regulation of
Abortion by the States, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 87, 153-57 (1993).
13. See Burk, supra note 4, at 1123-34; Reynolds, supra note 4, at 537-42.
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found an appreciative audience in the Southern District of New York,
where, in American Libraries Ass'n ['ALA"] v. Pataki,14 a federal court
flatly ruled that states have no jurisdiction to enact cyberlaw.1
The prospect of the states being stripped of their traditional
powers to provide for the health, safety, and morals of their citizens16
while in cyberspace has excited surprisingly little academic commen-
tary. This silence is especially odd given the general agreement that
"[flederalism is exceedingly popular these days."17 This Note seeks to
redress the imbalance between horizontal and vertical federalism con-
cerns. Placing the Edgar family of cases in the broader historical con-
text of the Supreme Court's extraterritoriality rulings reveals that the
dormant Commerce Clause is not nearly so destructive of state sov-
ereignty as has recently been supposed. Rather, the cases document
the Court's struggles with the concern that states regulate only those
enterprises that bear a substantial relation, or "nexus," to state inter-
ests. Historically, the roots of this notion rest in substantive due
process. Today, however, the nexus concern survives quite explicitly
in a subset of dormant Commerce Clause cases-tax cases. Why
courts apply the nexus concept to tax cases but not others poses a dis-
turbing question; there is very little reason to think that "jurisdiction
to tax" should be much different from "jurisdiction to regulate." This
Note argues that modern extraterritoriality cases like Edgar do in
fact reflect nexus concerns, rather than the Court's announced dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis, and properly so. Recognition of
distinct nexus issues sheds considerable light on state power to regu-
late Internet conduct. Because the nexus requirement derives from
due process, courts can turn to the growing corpus of Internet per-
sonal jurisdiction cases for guidance as to whether the exercise of
state legislative power over a given subject matter is appropriate.
The due process decisions suggest that although meaningful limita-
tions on their authority exist, the states retain regulatory power over
significant aspects of cyberspace.
Part II of this Note explores the nature of cyberspace. This
exploration reveals that critics of state regulation underestimate the
malleability of the new medium. In particular, they overlook the
14. ALA v. Patald, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
15. Id. (stating that "the Commerce Clause ordains that only Congress can legislate in
this area").
16. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In reviewing
state legislation, whether considered to be in the exercise of the State's police powers, or in
provision for the health, safety, morals or welfare of its people, it is clear that what is concerned
are 'the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.' ").
17. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1487 (1994).
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possibility that states can enact "zoning" laws, or regulations that
require Internet actors to provide access controls to the data that they
purvey. Part III then turns to the dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to state zoning of the Internet. Beginning with the general
contours of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this Part moves
to an examination of the Edgar line of cases, concluding that they do
not represent "a new territorialism." Part IV describes how, in ALA v.
Pataki, a federal district court nonetheless invoked the dormant
Commerce Clause to rule that states cannot regulate the Internet.
This claim is examined from a historical perspective in Part V.
The history shows that, despite widespread assumptions that
the extraterritoriality problems raised by the Internet are sui generis,
the Supreme Court has faced similar concerns with new technologies
like the telegraph. Although the Court initially made broad
pronouncements about state incompetence to regulate the
telegraph-much as the ALA v. Pataki court did with the Internet-it
eventually accommodated state regulatory interests. Part V predicts
that the courts will be obliged to make room for state interests by
reading a nexus requirement into the Edgar line of cases. However,
this Part concludes that the First Amendment, not the dormant
Commerce Clause, will be the ultimate repository of the Court's
Internet extraterritoriality analysis.
II. THE NATURE OF THE INTERNET
A. The Conception
The Internet has military origins. 18 Engineers thought it im-
perative to create a network of computers that would continue to
function if some part were destroyed in combat.'9 Toward that end,
Internet architects created an electronic space decoupled from the
geographic world. The first steps were taken in 1969, when the
Department of Defense created the Advanced Research Project
18. See H. Gilbert, Introduction to TCP/IP (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://pclt.cis.yale.edu/
pclt/COMMifTCPIP.HTM> (discussing the role of the Department of Defense in developing the
Internet).
19. See id. (discussing robustness of IP networks as a consequence of battlefield
conditions).
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Agency Network ("ARPANET).20 ARPANET gave researchers real-
time access to remote computing resources by linking systems oper-
ated by different branches of the military.21 Because these systems
were not always compatible, the Department of Defense promulgated
a suite of machine-language conventions in the 1970s.22 Known as
"Internet Protocols," these conventions allowed cooperating computers
to share digital information.23 The Internet Protocols were fantas-
tically successful, enabling ARPANET to connect to dozens of other
networks.2 By the late 1980s, ARPANET had fallen out of use, but
the "network of networks" that it sired survives today.2
B. How the Internet Operates
The Internet's basic workings frequently confound geography.
Every machine on the Internet has an address, 6 but these addresses
are logical rather than geographical. Internet Protocol ("IP")
identifies computers with a unique thirty-two bit number which, for
easier reading, is split into four eight-bit numbers.27 The IP address
of the principal server at the White House, for example, is
198.137.240.91.28 Needless to say, most of the world's forty million
Internet users29 would have no idea that 198.137.240.91 corresponds
to any particular geographical locale.
To make IP addresses more easily identifiable, a Domain
Name System was introduced in 1984.30 The Domain Name System
gives Internet hosts ordinary-sounding labels which are more memo-
rable than IP addresses.3' The White House server discussed above,
20. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringment on Global
Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1993) (discussing the creation of ARPANET).
21. See id.
22. See id; Gilbert, supra note 18.
23. See Charles L. Hedrick, What is TCP/IP? (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http'//oac3.hsc.uth.
tmc.edu/staff'snewton/tcp-tutorial/secl.html> ("TCP/IP is a set of protocols developed to allow
cooperating computers to share resources across a network.").
24. See Burk, supra note 20, at 16.
25. See id.
26. See Gilbert, supra note 18.
27. See id.; Hedrick, supra note 23; see also OLAF KIRCH, THE LINUX NETWORK
ADMINISTRATOR'S GUIDE (1994), reprinted in Ronald Abramson, Trademarks and the Internet,
438 PLI/Pat 299, 321 (1996).
28. See KIRCH, supra note 27, at 321.
29. This number is a 1996 estimate. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). The
number may be much higher now, given that there were expected to be 200 million Internet
users by 1999. See id.
30. See KIRCH, supra note 27, at 324.
31. See id.
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for instance, is known simply as whitehouse.gov.32 In order to resolve
a domain name into its corresponding IP address, a computer need
only contact other machines which maintain tables of network names
and numbers.33 After a series of queries, the system which owns the
domain name in question will return the desired address. 4 The
Domain Name System might seem to map the Internet onto physical
reality. After all, a person transmitting data to whitehouse.gov quite
likely knows that she is entering into a transaction in Washington
D.C. Nevertheless, considerable disjunction exists between electronic
domains and the geographical world. Domains are collections of sites
which are logically related.3 5 In some cases, the relation may be geo-
graphical, but many domains are constructed around functional or
proprietary relationships.36 Furthermore, a domain name need not
give geographical information about the system it identifies.
Even if an Internet user knows with perfect certainty the ulti-
mate physical destination of the information she is sending, she has
no way of knowing what route her information will follow. When data
is transmitted on the Internet, protocols chop the message into man-
ageable bits called "datagrams."37 Each datagram is addressed sepa-
rately and routed to a "gateway," a system which connects a network
with one or more other networks.38 Gateways make individualized
decisions about how to route the datagrams next; the more
sophisticated detect congestion and damage along the network, and
send information by the most efficient path.3 9 Once datagrams have
been received at their destination, protocols reassemble them into
their original form.40 The Internet user who began this process has
little control over the route which the network will choose for her
information. Indeed, it is possible that the component datagrams of a
32. See Welcome to the Whitehouse (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http'//www.whitehouse.gov/WH/
Welcome.html>.
33. See KIRCH, supra note 27, at 327; Gilbert, supra note 18.
34. See KIERCH, supra note 27, at 327.
35. See id at 324 (stating that "[a] domain is a collection of sites that are related in some
sense").
36. See id. (noting that sites might comprise a domain because they form part of a proper
network or because they belong to a particular organization).
37. See Hedrick, supra note 23, at <http://oac3.hsc.uth.tmc.edu/staff/snewton/tcp-tuto-
ria]sec2.html>.
38. See Burk, supra note 20, at 13 (discussing gateways); Hedrick, supra note 23, at
<http'/loac3.hsc.uth.tm.edu/staff/snewton/tcp-tutorial/sec2.html> (discussing addressing); id. at
<http/oac3.hsc.uth.tmc.edu/staff/snewton/tcp-tutorial/sec6.html> (discussing gateways).
39. See Burk, supra note 20, at 12; Gilbert, supra note 18.
40. See Burk, supra note 20, at 12; Hedrick, supra note 23, at <http'//oac3.hsc.uth.tmc.
edu/staff/snewton/tcp-tutria/sec2.html>.
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single message may follow entirely different paths.41 As a
consequence, the user may find herself electronically entering
unforeseen jurisdictions, where her data can be intercepted and
interpreted.
C. Proposed Methods of Regulating the Internet
1. Self-regulation
Cyberspace is thus not tightly tethered to a discrete set of
points in the terrestrial world. A number of commentators have
seized on this fact to argue that the Internet should be subjected only
to consensual self-regulation. In a particularly influential essay,
Professors Johnson and Post root the jurisdiction of terrestrial
sovereigns in four related considerations: power, effects, legitimacy,
and notice.42 For Johnson and Post, the independence of electronic
communication from physical locality means that territorial
regulation of on-line activities can serve none of these justifications.4
Consequently, attempts to regulate cyberspace from without are "as
futile as an effort to tie an atom and a bit together."4
Self-regulatory models of the Internet are grounded largely in
contract principles.45 Access to the medium as a whole typically re-
quires entering into an agreement with an Internet service provider,
and owners of individual systems or sites can condition use on adher-
ence to contractual terms.46 Proponents of self-regulation argue that
contracts governing access to cyberspace can incorporate the unique
norms of the on-line community.47 On-line actors who do not conform
their behavior to those norms will find that the denizens of the
Internet refuse to interact with them, or banish them from cyberspace
altogether.48 In cases where norms are unclear or conflict, Internet
41. See Burk, supra note 20, at 12; Hedrick, supra note 23, at <http'//oac3.hsc.uth.tmc.
edu/staff/snewton/tcp-tutoria/sec2.html>.
42. See Johnson & Post, supra note 8, at 1369-70.
43. See id. at 1371-76.
44. Id. at 1374.
45. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 8, at 523-32 (discussing contractual models ofcyberspace
governance); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for 'Cyberspace," 55 U. PIrr. L. REV.
993, 1028-32 (1994) (describing contracts approaches).
46. See Hardy, supra note 45, at 1029 (discussing contracts between users and system ad-
ministrators).
47. See Gibbons, supra note 8, at 526 (arguing that the contract model fits into the
existing cultural norms of cyberspace).
48. See id. at 517, 518-23 (discussing the threat of disconnection and other social controls
in cyberspace).
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users can resolve their disputes on-line, typically through arbitra-
tion.49
From a purely pragmatic perspective, self-regulation appears
unlikely to curb all types of on-line behavior which might have unde-
sirable consequences in the physical world. As Professor Jack
Goldsmith has pointed out, the kind of private ordering that
regulation skeptics envision may work well for default rules-that is,
laws that presumptively govern a particular transaction, but that can
be set aside by the parties to the transaction-but makes considerably
less sense with mandatory rules that a sovereign creates to protect
third parties or to further paternalistic aims.50 Indeed, committing
the Internet to a course of self-regulation might provoke a kind of
digital "race to the bottom,"51 because Internet providers who imposed
the least onerous contractual burdens presumably would do the best
business. That prospect seems distinctly undesirable for regulatory
laws that express a community's desire for the safety and morals of
its citizens.
2. National Regulation
Some critics who recognize the problem of external control
advocate regulation on the national level,52 an alternative that has the
dubious advantage of avoiding multifarious pronouncements on the
subject of Internet law by local authorities. Aside from ignoring the
possibility that the values of competitive federalism might obtain in
cyberspace, this approach also encounters problems on a practical
level. The government of the United States, for one, simply does not
desire to erect a significant regulatory structure around the Internet.
In a recent draft report, the Interagency Working Group on Electronic
49. The most notable cyberspace dispute resolution system is the Virtual Magistrate
Project at Villanova University. See Virtual Magistrate Project (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http.//vmag.vcilp.org/>. A basic discussion of the Project can be found in Gibbons, supra note
8, at 534-39. For discussion of arbitration of Internet disputes generally, see HENRYH. PERRrIT,
JR., LAw AND THE INFORMATION SUPEmGHWAY § 12.14, at 536 (1996 & Supp. 1999); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 94-100 (1996).
50. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1209-10
(1998).
51. A "race to the bottom" is a progressive relaxation of standards spurred by competition
to attract business that occasions a reduction in social welfare. See Kirsten H. Engel, State
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 'Race" and Is It 'To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 271, 274 (1997). Professor William Cary coined the phrase in 1974. See William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
52. See, e.g., Gigante, supra note 7, at 434 (advocating preemption of state and local
regulation of Internet administration); McGlosson, supra note 7, at 305 (urging federal
regulations to preempt state regulations governing on-line securities trading).
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Commerce cited a desire for "the broadest possible free flow of
information across international borders" as a major factor in its
recommendations. 3 Accordingly, the Working Group advocated non-
regulatory, market-oriented controls for the Internet.54
3. Zoning
Practical difficulties aside, the argument that local authorities
should be divested of power to regulate cyberspace fundamentally
misconstrues the nature of the medium. Apologists of jurisdiction-
stripping focus on Internet transactions rather than on Internet ar-
chitecture. The lack of one-to-one correspondence between geography
and cyberspace means that Internet transactions happen everywhere,
but nowhere in particular.55 Territorial sovereigns that attempt to
regulate such transactions will therefore assert power over actors who
have no real connection to the jurisdiction. But this line of reasoning
ignores the possibility that states might direct their power to the very
structure of cyberspace, rather than to the events which occur within
it. Professor Lessig calls this possibility "zoning"-subsidizing tech-
nologies of control which increase the ability to select who gets access
to what.56
Scant attention has been paid to zoning, an oversight which
likely proceeds from a static conception of the Internet as a collection
of hardware. The maxim, already stated in this Note, that the
Internet is "a network of networks," illustrates the problem. 57  It
suggests that changing the imperfect architecture of cyberspace would
require entry into a thicket of cable and silicon chips. 58 To be sure,
cyberspace could be zoned by means of hardware. States could compel
the creation of hierarchical networks and then impose control over the
53. A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (visited May 25, 1999) <http'//www.iitf.
nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm>. A good summary of the report can be found in Nicholas W.
Allard & David A. Kass, Law and Order in Cyberspace: Washington Report, 19 HASTINGS
Comm. & ENT. L.J. 563, 596-601 (1997).
54. See A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 53. For normative
arguments as to why state regulation might be superior to national regulation in some
circumstances, see infra Part VI.
55. See Johnson & Post, supra note 8, at 1375.
56. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1409 (1996).
57. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
58. See M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers
in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 341 ("The often-heard statement that the Internet is
a network or set of networks suggests that the Internet is hardware.").
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gateways to the system.59 China has already pursued this strategy,
building a pair of government-operated subnets connected to the rest
of cyberspace by a small number of regulated servers.60 In more
liberal jurisdictions, however, the financial and free-speech costs of
hardware regulation seem to outweigh the benefits of improved
control. Viewing the Internet in terms of hardware creates the im-
pression that zoning is prohibitively costly, and thus can be ignored.
Hardware is not the Internet's most defining feature; Internet
Protocols are.61 Protocols determine how information moves from
place to place on the Internet;62 they are its nerves and muscles and
arteries. Hardware is merely the skeleton. In the words of one
scholar, "the Internet is software."63 The primacy of software means
that "[c]yberspace is malleable;"6 changing its structure requires no
more effort than rewriting lines of code.6 Software can create regions
within cyberspace by imposing conditions, delimiting borders, and
narrowing the options of users. 66 In short, software furnishes a cost-
effective means of zoning.
Advocates of self-regulation question the effectiveness of zon-
ing. They cite sophisticated Internet users who can reconfigure their
connections to conceal their identities and locations, defeating the
technological borders that cordon off information.67 If credited, this
logic would demolish much real-world legislation. Sophisticated
counterfeiters will always be able to pass off bogus dollars, but that is
no argument for legalizing counterfeiting, or for printing easily
duplicated bills. So long as territorial jurisdictions can impose
transaction costs on Internet behavior, they can successfully regulate
it.68 And as Internet use becomes more widespread, and zoning
59. See Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty?-The Internet and the
International System, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 647, 651 (1997) (discussing state regulation of
cyberspace by exercising control over the physical components used to access the Internet).
60. See id at 652.
61. See Katsh, supra note 58, at 341 (M"he Internet is not a network but a set of communi-
cations protocols that allows information to flow among many different networks.").
62. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
63. Katsh, supra note 58, at 341.
64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) ("Cyberspace is malleable."); Katsh, supra note 58, at 341
("Cyberspace is malleable because of software.").
65. See Katsh, supra note 58, at 340.
66. See id. at 344.
67. See Johnson & Post, supra note 8, at 1374.
68. See Lessig, supra note 56, at 1405-06. On transaction costs generally, see Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
11051999]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
technologies more complex, the relative population of sophisticated
users will diminish, further enhancing the effectiveness of regulation.
Legislators increasingly can be expected to recognize software's
potential for regulating access to regions of cyberspace.69 At the na-
tional level, senators have already introduced a bill which would
condition school Internet subsidies on use of filtering software for in-
decent material70-a perfect example of legislative zoning. State legis-
latures will likely follow suit. As these laws come under attack,
courts will face complex questions of whether states have jurisdiction
to enact zoning legislation, what sorts of zoning are permissible, and,
most importantly, who can be made to bear the burden of zoning.
Answering these questions will require courts to plunge into the intri-
cacies of the dormant Commerce Clause.
III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. In General
No express provision of the Constitution enjoins the states
from regulating interstate commerce. Article I simply provides that
"The Congress shall have Power... [to regulate Commerce...
among the several states."71 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
found in the Commerce Clause a fount of power for striking down
state legislation which discriminates against or unduly interferes
with interstate commerce. As early as 1824, the Court in Gibbons v.
Ogden72 toyed with the possibility that dual sovereignty73 precluded
states from exercising authority over a subject matter which the
Constitution had seemingly committed to Congress. 74 Chief Justice
69. See Katsh, supra note 58, at 352.
70. See Internet School Filtering Act, S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998) (directing the Federal
Communications Commission to study and determine various filtering and blocking systems for
Internet portals in schools and libraries). The proposed legislation has attracted considerable
media attention. See, e.g., Bill Pietrucha, Bill Would Filter Internet Access to Schools,
NEWSBYrES NEWS N wwORK, Feb. 10, 1998; Internet: Senators Try to Force Net Filtering
Software on Schools, NETWORK BRIEFING, Feb. 10, 1998 (reporting reactions to Senators John
McCain and Earnest Hollings' bill).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
73. Dual sovereignty is "the notion that constitutional power was held in watertight com-
partments, each government supreme within its sphere." Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,
82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1997).
74 See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 575-76.
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Marshall found "great force in [the] argument"75 that "when a State
proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the
several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to
Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to
do."76 Ultimately, the Court disposed of the case on Supremacy
Clause grounds, 77 but Marshall's dictum had set the stage.
Five years later, the Court explicitly recognized the Commerce
Clause's negative aspect in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh C6.78
In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state law
that authorized construction of a dam across a navigable creek.79
Writing for the Court, Marshall declared the law valid, but noted the
possibility that state legislation might fail if "repugnant to the power
to regulate commerce in its dormant state."8o That possibility was
borne out in the Passenger Cases,8' which struck down statutes im-
posing bond requirements and taxes on immigrants arriving at state
ports. Although subsequent decisions have entrenched the dormant
Commerce Clause as a limitation on state power, a number of
commentators question its legitimacy.8 2
In its modern form, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine em-
bodies a two-prong test. First, the Court determines whether a state
law discriminates against interstate commerce8s "Discrimination"
75. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
76. Id. at 199-200.
77. See id. at 200-22.
78. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
79. See id. at 250-52.
80. Id at 252.
81. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). The decision badly fragmented the
Court; eight Justices wrote separate opinions in a 5-4 ruling. Among the majority, only three
Justices clearly based their votes on Commerce Clause grounds. See id. at 392 (McLean, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 410 (Wayne, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 452 (McKinley,
J., concurring in judgment). For a discussion of this confusing decision, see Sam Kalen,
Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in its First Century, 13 U. DAYTON L. REv. 417,
435-37 (1988).
82. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 446-55 (1982) (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause should perform the
functions currently served by the dormant Commerce Clause); Redish & Nugent, supra note 74,
at 582-90 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause has no basis in the text or structure of
the Constitution); see also FELIx FRANKFuRTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL,
TANEY AND WITE 13 (1937) ("The conception that the mere grant of the commerce power to
Congress dislodged state power finds no expression [in the records of the Constitutional
Convention].").
83. See Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) ("[Tlhe
first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause
is to determine whether it regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effect on interstate
commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce." (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979))); see also City of Philadelphia v. New
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means nothing more than "differential treatment of in-state and out-
of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter."84 Laws which are found to be discriminatory are subject to a
"virtual" per se rule of invalidity.m Virtuality translates into a least
restrictive means analysis; the state must show that it has no other
way to advance a legitimate local interest.86 State laws which survive
the first part of the dormant Commerce Clause ordeal next face the
balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.m Even if a law
"regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est," it will still be invalidated if it imposes a burden on interstate
commerce which is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."88 The Supreme Court purports to be quite solicitous of
benefits which flow to areas traditionally of local concern.
Regulations designed to protect public health or safety, for instance,
will not be overturned unless their justifications are "ilusory."10
Benefit-burden balancing has been a source of contention
among scholars and judges. Professor Regan has argued persuasively
that rather than balancing, the Court in fact engages in review for
discriminatory purpose.91 At least two Supreme Court Justices have
agreed with Professor Regan's proposition, contending that the Court
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (invalidating statute which discriminated against articles of
commerce originating outside of state).
84. Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99.
85. See id. Professor Regan has called this phrase "mildly oxymoronic." Donald H. Regan,
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1134 (1986).
86. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (citing Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding ban on importation of live baitfish because no avail-
able nondiscriminatory means could similarly protect state's environment)).
87. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
88. Id. The balancing test was first proposed by Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce
and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1940).
89. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) ("[A]
State's power to regulate commerce is never greater than in matters traditionally of local con-
cern.") (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)).
90. Id. (" f safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legis-
lative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate com-
merce." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429, 449 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring))). For a critique questioning the Courts
sincerity in this regard, see Friedman, supra note 73, at 353 ("Although the rhetoric of the
dormant Commerce Clause decisions sounds out favorably for state autonomy, in reality this
line of cases may be the most devastating to state authority.").
91. See Regan, supra note 85, at 1206-87; see also Robert A. Sedler, The Negative
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of
Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 910-11 (1985) (arguing that the overwhelming
majority of dormant Commerce Clause cases can be understood in terms of a nondiscrimination
principle).
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should eschew balancing for reasons of institutional competence. 92
Significantly for Internet issues, however, Regan concedes that the
Court performs a limited form of balancing in transportation and tax
cases, due to constitutionally significant national interests in an effi-
cient transportation and communications network.93 Whether the
second prong of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is regarded as
true benefit-burden balancing or merely as a subtler means of
"smoking out" a protectionist motive,9 one thing is certain: tradi-
tional Commerce Clause doctrine is remarkably un uited to resolving
cases in which a state enacts laws that regulate extraterritorial
trade.95 To treat the problem of extraterritoriality, the Supreme
Court has embarked upon a quite different line of cases.
B. A New Territorialism?
1. The Claim Prompted by Edgar and Its Progeny
Older Commerce Clause cases relied on a highly formalistic
dichotomy between "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate com-
merce.9 Suffusing this dichotomy were notions of territorial sover-
eignty.97 After 1937, formalism gave way to more pragmatic tests that
92. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to the term "balancing test" and arguing that "[tjhe analysis is similar to,
but softer around the edges than, the test we employ in cases of overt discrimination"); CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citing Regan's article and arguing that balancing is "ill suited to
the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all").
93. See Regan, supra note 85, at 1184; Regan, supra note 9, at 1883. But see Sedler, supra
note 91, at 910 (noting that the only two transportation cases which use "undue burden" analy-
sis are decades old).
94. See Friedman, supra note 73, at 351 (noting confusion among judges and scholars as to
whether the second step of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is "a way only of smoking out
more subtle protectionist legislation").
95. See Sedler, supra note 91, at 908-10 (arguing that the Court had "great difficulty in ar-
riving at a doctrinal basis" to sustain the result in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), an
extraterritoriality case, and that the case should have been decided on full faith and credit
grounds); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrTUToNAL LAW 409 (2d ed. 1988)
(arguing that the theme of political representation which underlies contemporary dormant
commerce clause doctrine is inapposite to extraterritorialism cases).
96. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) ("Nice distinctions
have been made between direct and indirect burdens."); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S.
189, 199 (1925) (stating that "a state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes
with or burdens.., commerce is a prohibited regulation); see also A.LA Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) ("[Tlhere is a necessary and well-established
distinction between direct and indirect effects" on interstate commerce.).
97. See Kalen, supra note 81, at 452-62 (discussing territorial sovereignty as a factor
affecting the validity of state laws in the nineteenth century).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
showed better appreciation for the workings of an integrated national
economy.98 A series of recent cases, however, has apparently resusci-
tated the old direct/indirect distinction, prompting one scholar to label
them "the new territorialism."99
First of these cases was Edgar v. MITE Corp.10" Edgar con-
cerned a challenge to Illinois' Business Take-Over Act, a statute
which regulated tender offers for a class of "target companies."o1 The
range of regulated businesses was extraordinarily broad; the Act ap-
plied to any corporation of which state residents owned ten percent of
the stock, or which satisfied any two of the following criteria: the cor-
poration had its principal executive office within the state, was incor-
porated in the state, or had ten percent of its stated capital and paid-
in surplus represented within the state.102 In a rich opinion, Justice
White questioned the law on numerous Commerce Clause grounds.' °3
White raised the specter of direct versus indirect effects, holding that
the statute directly regulated transactions which occurred across
state lines, even those which took place entirely outside of Illinois.104
The opinion noted "sweeping extraterritorial effect[s]," and hinted
that the law was invalid because it might impose inconsistent obliga-
tions on commercial actors. 0 5 In White's view, the statute also could
not pass muster under the Pike balancing test.'0
Edgar announced two very remarkable propositions. First,
Justice White struck at a definition of the extraterritoriality principle:
"The Commerce Clause... precludes the application of a state statute
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."o7 But
probably the most significant line in the opinion is its most
enigmatic--"[t]he limits on a State's power to enact substantive
legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of state
98. See Friedman, supra note 73, at 370-71 (discussing the death of legal formalism).
99. Bradford, supra note 12, at 153-57 (noting the return of a territorial component to
commerce clause analysis).
100. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion).
10L Id. at 626-27.
102. See id. at 627.
103. See id at 640-46. The law was also held invalid on Supremacy Clause grounds. See
id. at 630-34.
104. See id. at 641.
105. Id. at 642 ("]f Illinois may impose such regulations, so may other States; and in-
terstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be thoroughly
stifled.").
106. See id. at 643-46 (holding that the burden imposed on interstate commerce was exces-
sive in relation to the local interests served).
107. Id. at 642-43.
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court."108 The opinion does not elaborate, and the line has baffled
commentators.10 9 This Note suggests that, just as due process defines
the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, so too did it historically inform
the concerns underlying the analysis of Edgar and its progeny.
The decision in Edgar commanded only a plurality of the
Court. But many of its principles found more permanent expression
in the majority opinion in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority.110 Brown-Forman concerned a price affirma-
tion statute, a law which required liquor sellers in New York to agree
to charge prices no higher than those they would charge customers
elsewhere in the country during the upcoming month."' The central
issue in the case, the majority believed, was whether the statute
regulated out-of-state transactions." 2 Citing Edgar, the Court held
that the statute directly regulated interstate commerce by forcing
sellers to seek government approval in one state before conducting
business in another.13 The Court also faulted New York for project-
ing its legislation into other states, since the "practical effect" of the
statute was to control liquor prices in other states."4 The possibility
of subjecting the same business to inconsistent obligations in different
jurisdictions gave the Court pause, as it did in Edgar, but here the
Court was quite explicit about its concerns." 5 Significantly, the bene-
fit-burden analysis conducted in Edgar vanished in Brown-Forman.
However, Edgar's extraterritoriality analysis otherwise held up well
under majority scrutiny.
Things were to change, however, in a later case with facts
strongly resembling those of Edgar. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, the Court again encountered a state law which regulated
business acquisitions." 6 The CTS law mainly differed in regulating a
narrower class of entities; the statute applied only to businesses in-
corporated in Indiana, the enacting state."7 The Supreme Court up-
108. Id at 643. In support of this principle, Justice White cited a due process case. See id.
(citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (noting that by asserting extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion directly, a state will offend fellow states and surpass its inherent power)).
109. See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State
Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1, 35 (1992) ("[Olne can only speculate about [the state-
ment's] import.").
110. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
lL Id at 575-76.
112. See id. at 581.
113. See i at 582.
114. Id. at 583.
115. See id.
116. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
117. Id. at 73.
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held the Indiana act. n8 In doing so, the Court emphasized that the
Edgar opinion did not amass five votes,"9 and seemed to retreat from
its extraterritoriality reasoning. Rather than considering whether the
law had the practical effect of regulating out-of-state conduct, the
Court asked if it would lead to inconsistent regulation of interstate
commerce, and if Indiana had sufficient interest in the activity it was
regulating. °20 The Court answered the first question in the negative,
noting that corporations would be subject to the law of only one state
even if other states enacted statutes patterned after Indiana's.121 So
far as state interests were concerned, the Court had no difficulty con-
cluding that Indiana had a legitimate interest in regulating its own
corporations. 22
Attempting a synthesis of these cases was the task of Healy v.
Beer Institute,m the last decision in the extraterritoriality saga.
Healy involved another price affirmation statute. Unlike the
"prospective" law in Brown-Forman, however, this statute required
only that out-of-state sellers affirm that their prices were no higher
than those being charged in neighboring states at the time of af-
firmation.124 To assess the constitutionality of the statute, the Court
constructed a framework from the bones of the preceding extraterri-
toriality cases. It is worth repeating at length:
Taken together, our cases concerning the extraterritorial effects of state eco-
nomic regulation stand at a minimum for the following propositions: First, the
Commerce Clause... precludes the application of a state statute to commerce
that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the com-
merce has effects within the state .... Second, a statute that directly controls
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the in-
herent limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of
whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.
The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State. Third, the practical effect of the
statute must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the
statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact
with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would
arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.
Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legis-
118. See id. at 94.
119. See id. at 81.
120. See id. at 88-89, 93.
121. Seeid. at 89.
122. See id. at 93. For criticism of CTS, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and
The Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987).
123. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324(1989).
124. See id. at 335.
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lation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the juris-
diction of another State.125
In the end, the Court decided that no affirmation law could leap all
these hurdles.26
2. Implications of the Claim
The Healy synthesis, although ultimately unconvincing, sheds
some light on the extraterritoriality problem. As an initial matter,
the case casts considerable doubt on the viability of the direct/indirect
distinction in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and hence on the
proposition that Healy and its forebears represent "a new territorial-
ism." Healy mentions direct control of commerce only in connection
with legislative intent to apply a statute wholly outside a state's bor-
ders,' 7 seemingly collapsing it into the notion of projection. And the
facts of Healy themselves suggest that there is no rigid dichotomy be-
tween direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce. The law in
question did not prevent sellers from lowering their prices outside the
state so long as local prices were also lowered. The Healy law thus
had only an indirect extraterritorial effect, 128 yet it was struck down.
A comparison of Edgar and CTS further calls into question the
principle that the dormant Commerce Clause precludes states from
regulating commerce in a way that might impose inconsistent obli-
gations on businesses. The CTS Court asserted that the statute un-
der review would create no such inconsistencies29-an assertion
which is difficult to credit. Consider an example in which a
corporation is incorporated in one state, has its physical presence in
another, and has its shareholders in a third. All three states would
have a solid claim to regulate the business, and so to impose
inconsistent obligations upon it. Yet the law was upheld, unlike a
similar takeover statute in Edgar.130
Several commentators have expressed skepticism that courts
will extend the line of cases beginning with Edgar to questions involv-
125. Id at 336-37 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
126. See id& at 343.
127. Id. at 336.
128. See Welkowitz, supra note 109, at 36 (arguing that the statute in Healy had an indi-
rect effect on interstate commerce).
129. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
130. Edgar v. MITE Corp, 457 U.S. 624,646 (1982).
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ing state regulation of noncommercial activity.131 Unfortunately, this
skepticism has proven to be ill-founded. For in a recent case, ALA v.
Pataki, a federal district court employed Edgar and its progeny to
strike down a state law governing Internet content.
IV. ALA V. PATAKi
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") lately has begun
to challenge state legislation which regulates Internet content on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, as well as on First Amendment
grounds. In some cases, the courts have simply ignored the
Commerce Clause tactic.132 But the ACLU has recently found a
receptive audience for the argument in the Southern District of New
York. In ALA v. Pataki, the court heard a challenge to a New York
law which made it a crime to knowingly transmit obscene material to
minors via the Internet. 13 The law exempted from prosecution defen-
dants who took reasonable precautions to restrict access to such ma-
terial by "any method which is feasible under available technology."1'
The court heard argument on both First Amendment and
Commerce Clause grounds. Because the Supreme Court had not yet
handed down its decision in Reno v. ACLU,135 and because the New
York law was consistent with the Communications Decency Act,3 6 the
district court declined to rule on the First Amendment issues.3 7 The
court did consider the dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
remarking: "[T]he Internet is analogous to a highway or railroad.
131. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 12, at 154 ("It is unclear whether the Court would ac-
tually subject a state statute to strict scrutiny merely because of its extraterritoriality, where it
is neither discriminatory nor designed to protect local economic interests."); Seth F. Kreimer,
The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial
Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 496 (1992) (noting that "all of the
[extraterritoriality] cases in which statutes have been invalidated have involved laws which in
some sense could be characterized as economic protectionism or predation"); Welkowitz, supra
note 109, at 38 ("[E]ven though the Court spoke in terms of a per se rule for extraterritorial
regulations, it may well have been influenced by the protectionism evident in both [the Healy
and Brown-Forman] statutes.").
132. Compare Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/GABRIEF.html> (making the dormant Commerce
Clause argument), with ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (containing no
mention of the argument).
133. ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
134. Id. at 164.
135. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
136. 47 U.S.C. § 223(aX1X(B)(ii) (Supp. 1996) (held unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997)).
137. ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183 (stating that any determination of First
Amendment challenge should await the Supreme Court's forthcoming opinion).
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This determination means that the phrase 'information
superhighway' is more than a mere buzzword; it has legal
significance, because the similarity between the Internet and more
traditional instruments of interstate commerce leads to analysis un-
der the Commerce Clause."138
The court followed three strands of analysis in invalidating the
law. First, the court discussed the Edgar family of cases, quoting the
Healy synthesis substantially as it appears above.139 To test the law
against the extraterritoriality doctrine, the court focused on the na-
ture of the Internet. "New York has deliberately imposed its legisla-
tion on the Internet," the court wrote, "and, by doing so, projected its
law into other states whose... citizens use the Net."14 As a result,
New York's law was per se violative of the Commerce Clause.'41
Next, the court resumed the Pike balancing test abandoned by
Edgar's successors. The court acknowledged that the protection of
children against pedophilia was a legitimate state objective, but it
questioned the statute's efficacy in achieving that goal for three
reasons: the statute could not reach communications originating
outside the United States; it supposedly regulated only pictorial
messages; and it was interstitial when viewed in the larger
framework of New York obscenity law.14 On the burden side of the
equation, the court weighed the chilling effect the act would likely
have on Internet communication, as well as the heavy cost of
compliance for private Internet users.143 In the end, the court found
that New York's law tilted the burden arm of Pike's balance too far.'"
Finally, the court considered whether the statute would sub-
ject Internet users to inconsistent obligations. Citing a series of
transportation cases, none more recent than 1959, the court
concluded, "The Internet, like the rail and highway traffic at issue in
the cited cases, requires a cohesive national scheme of regulation so
that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations."'" At
this point in the opinion, it becomes clear that the court is not merely
invalidating the statute before it; it is denying the state all
138. Id at 161.
139. See id. at 174-75; see also supra note 125 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 177.
141 See id. (stating that the encroachment upon the authority of the federal government
and New York's sister states is per se violative of the Commerce Clause).
142. See id. at 178-79.
143. See id. at 180.
144. See id. at 181 (stating that the severe burden resulting from the statute was not justi-
fiable).
145. Id. at 182.
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jurisdiction to regulate, the Internet. On the penultimate page of the
opinion, the Court announced: "Haphazard and uncoordinated state
regulation can only frustrate the growth of cyberspace."146
The opinion inALA v. Pataki is deeply flawed. Two of its three
"modes of analysis" cannot withstand scrutiny. When applying the
benefit-burden analysis, the court focused most heavily on the chilling
effect the law would have on communication. 147 ALA v. Pataki
appears to be the only federal Commerce Clause case which has
struck down a law on the basis that "chilling" outweighed any local
benefits.' 8s Indeed, employing the notion of chilling in a balancing
test is suggestive of First Amendment analysis. 49 When combined
with the fact that the court cited only First Amendment cases in this
section of the opinion, 50 it becomes apparent that the court did what
it said it would not do-it applied First Amendment analysis in the
guise of a dormant Commerce Clause test.
The court's third mode of analysis, the potential for inconsis-
tent regulation, is not an independent constitutional test. Rather, it
represents "double-dipping" in the Commerce Clause pot. In support
of the test, the court cites a bevy of antique transportation cases, 151 all
of which were decided before the advent of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
But in the Supreme Court's most recent transportation case, Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., the Court found unconstitutional a
state truck-length limitation (which arguably could have subjected
truckers to all manner of inconsistent regulations) simply by applying
the Pike test.152 The upshot is that the possibility of inconsistent
obligations may figure prominently as a burden in the Pike analysis,
but it is no constitutional touchstone which alone can subject a state
regulation to a per se rule of invalidity.
This process of elimination leaves the ALA v. Pataki court with
only the extraterritoriality analysis it conducted under Edgar. As the
146. Id at 183.
147. See id. at 180.
148. The query "CHILLING/P INTERSTATE COMMERCE" in Westlaw's ALLFEDS data-
base produces 16 hits, but none of these cases strike down a law on the ground that "chilling"
outweighs local benefits in a Pike analysis (search of WESTLAW Allfeds database (Mar. 22,
1999)).
149. Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (balancing the importance of the
interest furthered by government regulation against the restriction on First Amendment
freedoms).
150. See ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 179-80.
15L See id. at 181-82.
152. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981) (applying the
Pike test and implicitly recognizing the potential for inconsistent regulation by noting that the
state's law "is now out of step with the laws of all other" surrounding states).
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next Part shows, the historical underpinnings of the extraterritor-
iality principle suggest that this reading of Edgar will not remain
viable. Indeed, Edgar can plausibly be read to require nothing more
than a substantial nexus between state regulatory interests and the
enterprises to be regulated. Such an interpretation would preserve
state jurisdiction to enact Internet zoning laws.
V. RE-EMPOWERING THE STATES
A construction of the dormant Commerce Clause that raises a
per se rule of invalidity against state regulation of the Internet is un-
likely to remain durable. The Supreme Court has confronted new
technologies in the past that defied territorial notions of sovereignty,
yet found room for state regulation. Subpart A describes the Court's
experimentation with one such technology: the telegraph. Just as
ALA v. Pataki coupled a simple analogy to transportation with broad
pronouncements of state incompetence to regulate the Internet, so too
did the early telegraph cases. But the Supreme Court eventually re-
trenched its analogy in the telegraph context to accommodate state
regulatory interests. Subpart B describes how much the same thing
might be accomplished with the Internet. In particular, this section
suggests that rather than propping up a blanket prohibition on state
regulation of the Internet, the Edgar v. MITE Co. line of cases can be
read to embody a nexus requirement that would permit regulation
based on the strength of the relation between state interests and the
regulated enterprises. On this reading, courts would likely allow
regulation in areas where state interests have traditionally been held
strong, as with intentional torts and business conducted with state
citizens. Finally, subpart C suggests that extraterritoriality analysis
of Internet matters will have a brief lifetime under the dormant Com-
merce Clause; in light of the Supreme Court's decision in ACLU v.
Reno, the new locus of the extraterritoriality principle will be the
First Amendment.
A. The Telegraph Cases
Extraterritorialism finds its earliest expression in the dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century. The
Commerce Clause cases of this era, both affirmative and negative,
employed the language of dichotomy to define legislative competence.
"Local" legislation, legislation that had only "indirect" effects on inter-
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state commerce, and exercises of "police power" all fell within the
purview of state legislatures; "national" legislation with "direct" ef-
fects on commerce, or invocations of the "commercial power" belonged
exclusively to Congress. 153 Even within this formal, binary frame-
work, however, a half-spoken judicial concern for the extraterritorial
effects of state legislation is evident. In Hall v. DeCuir, for instance,
the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana statute that forbade seg-
regation on public conveyances, including those that traveled across
state lines.154 Although the Justices relied primarily on the di-
rect/indirect and national/local distinctions to invalidate the law,155
Chief Justice Waite lodged another objection: "While [the statute]
purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State, it
must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the man-
agement of his business throughout his entire voyage."156
The Court refined this general objection-that otherwise valid
police regulations should not determine the conduct of actors beyond
the state's boundaries-when it encountered a new technology: the
telegraph. In a series of cases beginning the same term as the deci-
sion in Hall v. DeCuir, the Court considered the implications of a
medium that, like the Internet, was not particularly respectful of geo-
graphical boundaries. This chronically understudied line of cases
thus offers compelling parallels to the federal courts' current strug-
gles with cyberspace. And insofar as the telegraph cases suggest that
the jurisprudence of new technology passes through stages of simple
analogy, retrenchment, and accommodation, they may sketch the path
that cyberlaw will follow.
"Will we regulate by analogy, or by something else?" Professor
Lawrence Lessig asked in 1995.157 Although Lessig was speaking of
cyberspace, the question, and his answer to it, have broader signifi-
cance. Lessig suggested that the new medium could initially be
153. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (contrasting direct
and indirect effects on interstate commerce); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 504-06 (1879)
(distinguishing between state police power and national commerce power); TRIBE, supra note 95,
at 407 (discussing the national/local distinction in Commerce Clause subject matter analysis).
154. Hall v. Decuir, 95 U.S. 485,490 (1878).
155. See id. at 488 (discussing direct burdens on interstate commerce); id. at 496-97
(Clifford, J., concurring) (employing the national/local analysis).
156. Id. at 489; see also Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876). The
Henderson Court used the local/national dichotomy to strike down a law that required shipown-
ers to furnish a bond for each passenger landed in the state. See id. at 274. But the Court also
found the law objectionable because its effective operation "commences at the other end of the
voyage." Id.
157. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744 (1995) (discussing
regulation of cyberspace and First Amendment implications).
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regulated by no other means than analogy.158 His words proved to be
prophetic, for, as seen above, the ALA v. Pataki court seized on a
crude analogy between the Internet and transportation in order to
bring the Commerce Clause to bear.59 Much the same thing hap-
pened with the telegraph in the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Little more than thirty years after its introduction, the tele-
graph was denominated an "instrumentality of commerce" by the
Supreme Court.160 The case making that pronouncement, Pensacola
Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., sounded under the
Supremacy Clause; at issue was whether an Act of Congress authoriz-
ing telegraph companies to maintain lines through the public domain
of the United States preempted a state law granting the petitioner a
monopoly in two counties. 161 The Court held that it did. That holding,
however, was strained; as both the petitioner and the dissent pointed
out, the Act merely granted a right of way on federal lands to tele-
graph companies whose operations were authorized by state law. 6 2
One suspects that the Court could have addressed the issue more
squarely under the dormant Commerce Clause, determining the ex-
tent to which the state could, in the Court's words, "control the
transmission of all telegraphic correspondence within its own juris-
diction.163
Whatever the reasons for the restraint, it was short lived. Just
four years later, a state tax on telegraph messages leaving a state
158. See id. ("For just how could cyberspace be regulated except by analogy?... We have
no choice but to take control of this space at first with our ordinary terms, if indeed we are to
understand it. And it is through a practice of analogy that this occupation occurs.").
159. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
160. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1878). In a revealing
passage, the Court hinted at the interaction between Commerce Clause jurisprudence and
technological progress:
The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of
commerce ... known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace
with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time
and circumstances. They extend from the horse with its rider to the stage-coach, from
the sailing-vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad,
and from the railroad to the telegraph, as these new agencies are successively brought
into use to meet the demands of increasing population and wealth. They were intended
for government of the business to which they relate, at all times and under all
circumstances.
Id. at 9.
Interestingly, even the timing of the Internet and telegraph cases seem comparable; the
Supreme Court is beginning to hear Internet cases nearly 30 years after the creation of
ARPANET.
161. Id. at 9-10.
162. See id. at 7, 16-17 (Field, J., dissenting).
163. I& at 11.
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came before the Court. To determine if the tax offended the
Constitution, the Court had no alternative but the dormant
Commerce Clause. The Court resorted to analogy:
A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of
messages, that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods. Both companies
are instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itself. They do
their transportation in different ways, and their liabilities are in some respects
different, but they are both indispensable to those engaged to any considerable
extent in commercial pursuits.' 64
This passage bears a striking resemblance to the rhetoric of ALA v.
Pataki, in which the court compared the Internet to a conduit for
interstate traffic in goods, services, and ideas. 65 And just as the ALA
v. Pataki court accompanied its analogy with a broad statement strip-
ping the states of power to regulate the new technology, so too did the
Supreme Court in Telegraph Co. v. Texas. In a classic statement of
the "old territorialism," the Court suggested that while states might
regulate commerce confined exclusively within their territories,
regulation of commerce which so much as "affects" other states be-
longs solely to Congress. 166 Accordingly, the Court struck down Texas'
tax. 6 7
The decisions made in the wake of Telegraph Co. v. Texas
sketch out directions that Internet dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence might follow. The simple analogy and jurispathy of ALA v.
Pataki may represent the state of the art in Internet jurisprudence,
but the corresponding telegraph cases have a much longer history.
These cases suggest that the courts will be obliged to retreat from
their hard-line stance toward state regulatory jurisdiction. Only six
years after Telegraph Co. v. Texas, the Supreme Court began to pare
back its transportation analogy. Citing "essentially different charac-
teristics," the Court in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton in-
dicated that the regulations suitable for transportation might be
"entirely inapplicable" to the telegraph.16s Retrenchment of the anal-
ogy did not immediately lead to an expansion of state jurisdiction,
164. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460,464 (1882).
165. ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
166. Telegraph Co., 105 U.S. at 466:
The rule that the regulation of commerce which is confined exclusively within the
jurisdiction and territory of a State, and does not affect other nations or States or the
Indian tribes, that is to say, the purely internal commerce of a State, belongs exclusively
to the State, is as well settled as that the regulation of commerce which does affect other
nations or States or the Indian tribes belongs to Congress.
167. See id.
168. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1887).
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however; resting its decision on a concern for uniform regulation, the
Pendleton court struck down a state law that controlled the order of
delivery of telegrams outside the state's borders. 69
More sensitive treatment of state regulatory authority did
eventually follow the collapse of the transportation analogy. Despite
the language in Telegraph Co. v. Texas suggesting that only Congress
could regulate the telegraph, the Supreme Court went on to uphold
various state laws concerning the now familiar medium. Thus, for
example, the Court sustained laws which controlled the delivery of
telegraph messages within the state,1'70 and which prevented tele-
graph companies from contractually limiting their liability, even
though the contracts were to be performed at least in part outside the
state.17' The Court attempted, unconvincingly, to distinguish its ear-
lier cases, suggesting that these regulations had only "incidental" ef-
fects on interstate commerce, and that they were in fact "aids" to in-
terstate commerce. 7 2 This reasoning is unpersuasive, particularly in
light of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., the
case which upheld liability limitations.'73  In the aftermath of
Commercial Milling, each state could enact different liability limita-
tions, thereby defeating the "necessity of one uniform plan of regula-
tion" upon which the earlier cases had rested.7 4 And because tele-
graph companies were likely to alter their conduct in view of their
exposure to liability, these laws would likely affect conduct outside
the borders of the enacting state-another prohibition of the earlier
cases. In essence, the Court had, by 1910, backed away from a blan-
ket prohibition of state regulation of the telegraph and had settled on
a substantial relation analysis. That is, the Court concluded that the
state where a telegraph contract was made had sufficient interest to
regulate that contract, even though it might affect conduct in other
states.
169. Id. at 358 ("Whatever authority the state may possess over the transmission and
delivery of messages by telegraph companies within her limits, it does not extend to the delivery
of messages in other states.").
170. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 662 (1896) (holding that a statute
imposing a penalty for failure to deliver telegraphic messages impartially was a valid exercise of
state power).
171. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 421 (1910)
(sustaining a Michigan statute that imposed affirmative duties on a telegraph company to de-
liver interstate messages).
172. See James, 162 U.S. at 661, 662.
173. Commercial Milling. 218 U.S. at 420-21.
174. Id. at 415.
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B. A New Reading of the New Territorialism:
The Nexus Requirement
We might expect much the same thing in the context of the
Internet. Just as the Supreme Court retreated from the blanket pro-
hibition on state regulation in Telegraph Co. v. Texas and moved
toward the accommodation of state interests, the courts are similarly
likely to move away from the extreme stance taken in ALA v. Pataki.
The question that remains is how this accommodation will occur.
This subpart suggests that courts might give effect to state interests
by finding a nexus requirement, rather than a per se rule, in Edgar v.
MITE Co. and its progeny.
Such a reading avoids the strained necessity of synthesizing
the four cases that comprise the "new territorialism." The affirmation
cases, Brown-Forman and Healy, center on a different issue from
Edgar and CTS, the tender offer cases. The affirmation cases
concerned the permissible means a state could employ to achieve a
regulatory objective; the tender offer cases, by contrast, concerned the
permissible objects of state regulation. Thus in Brown-Forman and
Healy, there was no dispute that the state had power to regulate
liquor sellers who transacted business within its confines; at issue
was how the state could regulate them-that is, whether the state
could artificially link local prices to conduct occurring elsewhere. But
in Edgar and CTS, the Court questioned whether the state had power
over the regulated entities at all.
The outcomes in the two tender offer cases turned on the
substantiality of the relation between state interests and the objects
of state regulation. In CTS, New York had jurisdiction because states
have a strong interest in regulating corporations which are created
under their laws. In Edgar, the connection between state interests
and the burdened enterprises was much more tenuous; Illinois
asserted jurisdiction over companies which might have no Illinois
shareholders and, at the same time, which might be incorporated in
another state. Accordingly, the Court held that the state's claim to
power was illegitimate. As the differing results in the tender offer
cases suggest, jurisdiction hinges on the presence of "some definite
link"175 between state interests and the regulated entities.
175. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954) (stating that due process re-
quires a link between a state and the person, property, or transaction to be taxed). As with
Edgar and CTS, Internet cases usually concern the objects of state regulatory power. States
typically regulate cyberspace on the basis of content; at issue, then, is the strength of the
connection between state interests and particular content providers.
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The idea that there must be a substantial connection between
state interests and the objects over which a state asserts power is
commonly known as a nexus requirement.7 6 The nexus requirement
surfaces in another line of Commerce Clause cases, taxation cases, in
which the Supreme Court has announced that it will sustain a state
tax against a Commerce Clause challenge when "the tax is applied to
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State."177
Because there is little reason to treat jurisdiction to tax differently
from jurisdiction to regulate, the tax cases suggest that a nexus
requirement might plausibly be found in Edgar. At the same time,
however, the tax cases hold that the nexus requirement is a peculiar
historical derivative of the Commerce Clause that limits jurisdiction
to tax to entities that are physically present in the state.
If applied to regulatory jurisdiction, the physical presence
aspect of the nexus requirement would of course proscribe most state
enactments of cyberlaw. But the physical presence rule rests on
shaky foundations. As a matter of policy, it seems dubious that state
power should contract as technology progresses, yet that is an
inevitable corollary of the physical presence rule in an increasingly
interconnected world. As a matter of history, the notion that the
nexus requirement- derives exclusively from the Commerce Clause is
simply wrong. The nexus requirement as currently expressed in the
tax cases stems from the Due Process Clause, a fact that could allow
courts to take a more generous stance toward state regulatory needs.
The seminal tax case is Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 7 8 At
issue in Quill was whether a state could impose a use tax on a mail
order business whose only contacts with the state were via U.S. mail
and common carrier.7 9 North Dakota argued that the nexus require-
ment established by the dormant Commerce Clause was identical to
the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause.' 80 Since Quill Corporation undoubtedly had sufficient
contacts to support personal jurisdiction, the state argued, the com-
pany was subject to taxation.18' The Court disagreed. Writing for the
176. See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1992) (discussing the
Due Process Clause and nexus requirement).
177. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). Valid taxes must also
be fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, and fairly related to the services provided by the state.
See id.
178. Quill, 504 U.S. at 298.
179. Id. at 301-02.
180. See id. at 312.
181. See id.
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majority, Justice Stevens reconfirmed the twenty-five year old holding
in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue that the
Commerce Clause mandates physical presence within a state as a
predicate to state jurisdiction to tax.8 2 To justify the holding, Stevens
embarked on a theoretical discussion of the differences between Due
Process and the Commerce Clause.18 The Court noted that the mini-
mum contacts test and the nexus requirement are animated by differ-
ent constitutional concerns, saying "the Commerce Clause and its
nexus requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fair-
ness for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the
effects of state regulation on the national economy."18 Consequently,
the Court felt secure in imposing a more stringent requirement for
jurisdiction to tax than for personal jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most significant line in Quill comes in Justice
Scalia's concurrence. Scalia wrote, "It is difficult to discern any prin-
cipled basis for distinguishing between jurisdiction to regulate and
jurisdiction to tax."'m This observation suggests that if the dormant
Commerce Clause prescribes a nexus requirement for tax cases, then
it must do the same thing for cases which determine a state's compe-
tence to regulate. Indeed, it is this realization for which the Court
was groping a few years earlier in Edgar and CTS. Contrary to
Scalia's remark, however, there is room for considerable discontinuity
between the taxation and regulatory nexuses. Jurisdiction to tax re-
fers to a state's ability to fill its coffers; jurisdiction to regulate, at
least in some instances, may dictate whether a state can protect the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. One would suspect that the
state has substantially greater leeway when legislating for the latter.
Determining the precise content of the regulatory nexus de-
pends in part on whether Justice Stevens was correct in his conten-
tion that the nexus requirement does not derive from the Due Process
Clause. In dissent, Justice White pointedly noted that one of the chief
architects of the nexus requirement, Justice Rutledge, specifically
acknowledged the due process origins of the requirement.'8 Other
historical evidence, overlooked by White, indicates that he is correct.
During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court located its extra-
territoriality jurisprudence in the Due Process Clause, rather than
182. See id. at 317-18 (citing National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753 (1967)).
183. See id. at 312-13.
184. Id- at 312.
185. Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 326-27 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the dormant Commerce Clause. The notion was that if a state pur-
ported to control the conduct of its citizens beyond its borders, it in-
fringed on the personal liberty interests of those individuals in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in the great case of Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, the Court struck down a state statute that punished
citizens for entering into unauthorized out-of-state insurance con-
tracts.187 The state's power, the Court said, "does not and cannot ex-
tend to prohibiting a citizen from making contracts.., outside of the
limits and jurisdiction of the State."m In similar fashion, the Court
continued to invalidate state legislation on the ground that due proc-
ess contained inherent territorial restrictions until well into the
twentieth century. 8 9
As the principle of dual sovereignty which underpinned strict
territorialism began to erode, the Court replaced Allgeyer with a
nexus analysis. Significantly, that analysis occurred under the Due
Process Clause. The principle case is Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Accident Commission, which upheld against a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge an application of California's Workers
Compensation law to redress an injury that took place in Alaska.19'
The court cited the liberty of contract cases as good law, but empha-
sized the state's interest in regulating the employer-employee rela-
tionship.' 91 The Court said: "California, therefore, had a legitimate
public interest in controlling and regulating this employer-employee
relationship in such fashion as to impose a liability upon the employer
for an injury suffered by the employee, and in providing a remedy
available to him in California."192 The case's progeny were even more
explicit in providing for a nexus requirement. In Hoopeston Canning
Co. v. Cullen, the Court upheld a New York law requiring foreign in-
surance companies doing business in the state to be licensed.193 The
Court framed the question of New York's regulatory jurisdiction un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment simply as: "[W]hether the insurance
187. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897).
188. Id. at 591.
189. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1918) (invalidating a
state law that prohibited a citizen from entering into a contract with a locally licensed foreign
corporation); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 'U.S. 149, 164 (1914) (holding that Missouri
could not extend the operation of its statutes relating to insurance policies into the jurisdiction
of other states).
190. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1935).
19L See id. at 540-42 (citingAllgeyer, Head, and Dodge).
192. Id. at 542-43.
193. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 322 (1943).
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enterprise as a whole so affects New York interests as to give New
York the power it claims."1 4
Cases like Alaska Packers and Hoopeston clearly implicate
nexus concerns; they test the strength of the link between state inter-
ests and regulated enterprises. What is significant here is that these
are due process cases, not Commerce Clause cases. This fact casts
considerable doubt on the majority position in Quill that the nexus
requirement is a peculiar doctrinal requirement of the Commerce
Clause. When combined with Justice White's observations, 9 5 the
majority's contention in Quill can safely be discarded. So too can its
mandate that jurisdiction be predicated on physical presence, a
requirement that would be inimical to most state regulation of the
Internet.
Acknowledging the nexus requirement's derivation from due
process assists in determining when state exercise of authority over
the Internet is appropriate. Relatively few Internet regulation cases
have been decided, but there is a significant, albeit small, body of case
law on Internet personal jurisdiction. As a general proposition, the
Internet due process cases indicate that mere presence in cyberspace
is not enough to support personal jurisdiction. That is, the fact that
an Internet communication is accessible in a forum does not give the
forum jurisdiction.196 If presence in cyberspace alone will not support
adjudicative jurisdiction, it seems highly unlikely that it will support
regulatory jurisdiction. In other ways, however, personal jurisdiction
on the Internet has been quite expansive. A line of cases springing
from Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz197 suggests that Internet users
who employ the cyberspace medium to transact business in another
state can be subjected to personal jurisdiction in that state.198
Another series of cases hailing from Calder v. Jones 99 provides that
jurisdiction can be predicated on intentionally harmful Internet con-
194. Id. at 316.
195. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1992) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
196. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("Regardless of the technical feasibility of such a procedure... mere foreseeability of an in-state
consequence and a failure to avert that consequence is not sufficient to establish personal ju-
risdiction."), affd 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
197. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
198. See, e.g., Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., No. IP96-1457-
C-M/S, 1997 WL 148567, at *4 (S.D. Ind. 1997) ("To transact business in this day of
instantaneous interstate electronic transmissions does not require a defendant to have
physically entered the state."); Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 399, 402 (Cal. App. 2d. 1997)
(stating that requisite minimum contacts may be electronic).
199. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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duct that is expressly directed at the forum state.20o Without sug-
gesting that jurisdiction to adjudicate is the equivalent of jurisdiction
to regulate, we might suspect that courts would be most hesitant to
strip states of regulatory jurisdiction of commercial speakers who use
the Internet to do business within the state and of tortfeasors who
intentionally aim their actions at the state.
In sum, the history of extraterritoriality suggests that courts
will ultimately be forced to withdraw from the absolute prohibition of
state regulation of the Internet announced in ALA v. Pataki. The
cases further suggest that this retreat might be accomplished by
finding a nexus requirement in the dormant Commerce Clause. But
unlike the nexus requirement in the jurisdiction-to-tax decisions,
which demands physical presence, the test employed by future courts
might simply inquire into the strength of the connection between the
state's regulatory interest and the enterprise sought to be regulated.
While this requirement would not allow a state to regulate all
Internet transactions, it would allow them to enact zoning legislation
targeted at actors who knowingly aim their conduct toward the state.
C. Extraterritoriality's Next Stop: The First Amendment
Reading a nexus requirement into the Edgar line of cases to
accommodate state interests may well be nothing more than a stop-
gap measure. The extraterritorialism principle historically has not
been tied to any one constitutional provision.201 As seen earlier, the
principle was born in the dormant Commerce Clause, migrated to the
Due Process Clause during the Allgeyer years, and has since returned
to the Commerce Clause.202 Recent case law suggests that extra-
territoriality analysis may be preparing for another leap, this time
into uncharted territory: the First Amendment.
In its only significant pronouncement to date on Internet law,
Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down the Communications
200. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998)
(citing Calder for the proposition that intentional trademark infringement via the Internet can
support personal jurisdiction); Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413,
419 (D. Ariz. 1996) (citing Calder for authority to subject a nonresident defendant to jurisdiction
in plaintiffs forum for making defamatory statements).
201. See Regan, supra note 9, at 1895 (justifying extraterritorialism by structural
inferences from the system as a whole); Welkowitz, supra note 109, at 58 (stating that no single
constitutional provision limits the exercise of state authority).
202. See supra Part VA_-B. The extraterritoriality principle has also found expression in
the Contracts Clause. See, e.g., New York, Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S.
628, 645-46 (1894) (striking down on Contracts Clause grounds a state law that required a
foreign corporation to collect taxes in the state of its incorporation).
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Decency Act ("CDA") on First Amendment grounds.203 The Act prohib-
ited the knowing transmission of obscene or "indecent" messages to
any recipient under eighteen years of age. 20 4 Relying on conventional
First Amendment analysis, the Court concluded that the CDA was
facially overbroad because it suppressed a large amount of constitu-
tionally protected adult speech in the name of protecting children
from potentially harmful material.205 But in a revealing passage, the
Court rooted its overbreadth analysis at least partially in extraterri-
toriality grounds. The Court said: "a parent who sent his 17-year-old
college freshman information on birth control via e-mail could be in-
carcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home
community found the material 'indecent' or 'patently offensive,' if the
college town's community thought otherwise."206
The concern that an individual at one end of a communications
device might be unpredictably subjected to the law of a jurisdiction at
the other end represents a classic extraterritoriality concern-indeed,
one voiced in the telegraph cases by courts addressing the question on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds. By tagging this concern as one
of "overbreadth," the Court seems to be signaling that these questions
are hereafter to be decided on First Amendment grounds. In this re-
gard, it should be remembered that the ALA v. Pataki court rested its
decision on Commerce Clause grounds only because the CDA case had
not yet been decided. 207 Now that it has, and with the analytical tools
of the First Amendment, it might be supposed that extraterritoriality
analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause is nearing the end of
its brief lifetime.
The demise of dormant Commerce Clause analysis in Internet
jurisprudence should be greeted with approval. Although at least one
commentator has lauded the usefulness of the Clause in constraining
state regulatory excesses, 08 the First Amendment seems a more pre-
cise tool. Whenever state legislators enact law affecting a communi-
cations medium, the strictures of free speech are doubtless uppermost
in their minds. It is much less likely that they consider an unwritten
203. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874(1997).
204. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. 1 1996).
205. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874-79.
206. Id. at 878.
207. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. Even in the aftermath of the CDA
case, ALA v. Pataki may be more than an isolated historical curiosity. Another court has
preliminarily enjoined a state Internet regulation on the ground that plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on their claim that the law violated the Commerce Clause. See ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (1998) (citingALA v. Pataki).
208. See Reynolds, supra note 4.
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constitutional commandment whose dictates have, in the words of
Justice Scalia, "made no sense."2°9 Conducting extraterritoriality
analysis under the First Amendment respects state legislatures by
giving them notice of the kinds of laws they can and cannot pass.
VI. CONCLUSION
State attempts to regulate the Internet have thus far been
fairly clumsy. The law struck down in ALA v. Pataki, for example,
amounted to a content-based restriction on the speech of actors who
had no substantial connection to the regulating jurisdiction. But
more sophisticated-and more legitimate-attempts are inevitable.
As states come to direct their regulatory efforts at controlling access
to Internet content, rather than at the content itself, and as they
impose regulatory burdens on actors who have significant state
contacts, rather than on Internet actors generally, courts will be
forced to develop more nuanced analyses to assess the validity of state
legislation. The early efforts of those who oversee the regulators have
been no less clumsy than efforts of the regulators themselves.
The positive and predictive accounts set forth in this Note
suggest that a construction of the Commerce Clause which props up a
per se rule of invalidity against all state regulation of the Internet
cannot be sustained. If history is any guide, courts will find in the
Commerce Clause a nexus requirement that will allow states, no less
than Congress, to map out the zones of cyberspace. Ultimately,
however, the First Amendment will become the judicial tool of choice
for evaluating the constitutionality of state cyberlaw.
On a normative level, re-empowering the states would serve
the goals of competitive federalism. The federalism concern that has
most compromised state regulatory jurisdiction is "exit"; if Internet
actors could be regulated merely because their communications were
accessible from a particular forum, it was thought, then these actors
could avoid regulation only by quitting cyberspace altogether. 210 But if
states could regulate actors with a substantial connection to state
interests, a cyberspace enterprise could exit simply by severing its
relationship with a particular state. The possibility of exit would
encourage states to experiment with cyberlaw to provide attractive
209. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. See Burk, supra note 4, at 1102 (discussing exit).
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packages of goods and services to their citizens. In this on-line
equivalent of the laboratory of the states,2 11 a "competition among
rule-sets"212 would ensure that only the most effective and desirable
regulations would survive. Perhaps most importantly, the nexus
requirement would help preserve the sovereignty of the states in the
new electronic frontier. There, as in the physical world, a diffusion of
power will better secure liberty.213
James E. Gaylord*
211. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(describing the states as laboratories of democracy).
212. Lessig, supra note 56, at 1406.
213. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[Tlhe Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty.").
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